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INCENTIVES AND THE ESA:  
CAN CONSERVATION BANKING  
LIVE UP TO POTENTIAL? 
CHRISTOPHER S. MILLS† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) began as command and 
control legislation that relied on the threat of severe civil and criminal 
sanctions to assure compliance with a categorical prohibition on the 
“taking” of members of endangered species. Beginning in 1983, how-
ever, Congress and the executive branch began using a different, in-
centive-based approach. First, by amending the ESA to include sec-
tion 10, Congress created a way for landowners to continue 
development in habitats harboring endangered species: the landown-
ers were permitted to incidentally take endangered species in ex-
change for the implementation of a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(“HCP”), which served to actively manage endangered species con-
servation for the species affected.1 Second, the Clinton Administra-
tion created the No Surprises Policy, which provided assurance to 
landowners that once they obtained section 10 permits to incidentally 
take endangered species in exchange for creating a HCP, they would 
not be required to expend additional resources to respond to unfore-
seen circumstances that could arise and threaten the species managed 
in the HCP.2 Part I of this Note examines the evolution of these in-
centive-based approaches and how they changed the incentive struc-
ture for landowners. 
Part II of this Note examines a new incentive-based method of 
conserving endangered species—conservation banking. Conservation 
banking has enormous potential to radically improve endangered 
species conservation while drastically reducing the cost of doing so. 
 
 † The author wishes to thank Professor Jonathan Wiener and Douglas Wheeler for their 
guidance and advice for this paper, and Meryl Eschen who helped enormously with research 
and editing. 
 1. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a) (2000). 
 2. 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998), available at http://endangered.fws.gov/r/f980223.pdf. 
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The Department of Interior, recognizing this potential, recently is-
sued a Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conser-
vation Banks.3 This Note analyzes the incentive structure created by 
conservation banks and its significance with respect to the advantages 
that conservation banks may provide. It then addresses whether con-
servation banking can live up to expectations through addressing the 
potential problems with conservation banks, including choosing an 
adequate currency and market structure. A solution to the problem of 
currency choice is proposed, followed by a discussion of the problem 
with market structure created by this solution. 
PART I:  INCENTIVES AND THE ESA 
I.  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 
The Endangered Species Act was enacted in 1973 for the pur-
pose of conserving threatened and endangered species, as well as the 
ecosystems upon which they depend.4 
The Act aimed to protect endangered species in two ways. First, 
in section 7 of the Act, Congress required all federal agencies to re-
view their actions and carry out programs for the conservation of en-
dangered and threatened species.5 Agencies now must consult with 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)6 to determine if any 
agency action is likely to “jeopardize” a threatened or endangered 
species.7 The agency must then revise its actions in order to avoid 
such jeopardy.8 
 
 3. Memorandum from Matt Hogan, Acting Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
to the Regional Directors, Region 1-7, Manager, California Nevada Operations Office (May 3, 
2003), available at http://endangered.fws.gov/policies/conservation-banking.pdf . Notice of avail-
ability at 68 Fed. Reg. 24753 (May 8, 2003). 
 4. 16 U.S.C. §1531(b) (2000). Determinations of endangerment are made pursuant to §4 
of the Act. See 16 U.S.C. §1533 (2000). 
 5. 16 U.S.C. §1536 (2000). 
 6. Or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) if the endangered species is marine. 
 7. 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2). 
 8. 16 U.S.C. §1536(a), (c). Originally the ESA flatly prohibited the taking of endangered 
species through federal projects. The U.S. Supreme Court so held in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978), when it enjoined the operation of the nearly complete Tellico Dam. In response, Con-
gress passed the 1978 Amendments to the ESA, Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978), that included a “procedure whereby federal agencies 
can receive exemptions from the requirements of the Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 9454. In 1982 Congress added § 7(b)(4) and § 7(o) to 
the ESA, which provided that the Secretary could authorize incidental taking of a species, and 
avoid §7(a)(2) liability. H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826. 
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Second, in section 9 of the Act, Congress prohibited the “taking” 
of any listed animal species by any party, public or private.9 “Take” is 
defined broadly to mean to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or to attempt to engage in any such con-
duct.”10 This expansive definition includes habitat modification, such 
as that which occurs when land is developed, because “harm” “may 
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behav-
ioral patters, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”11 Violators 
face the possibility of both civil12 and criminal sanctions.13 
Strangely, by the time Congress considered amending the ESA in 
1982 to create an exception to section 9 liability, there had been rela-
tively little outcry from private landowners about the imposition of 
section 9 liability “because there had been no conflicts between de-
velopment and the section 9 prohibitions.”14 However, having experi-
enced first-hand the power of the taking prohibition in the case of the 
Tellico Dam,15 Congress was receptive to the potential impact section 
9 might have on private parties.16 In fact, Congress listened carefully 
when one party, a developer in San Mateo, California, that was wor-
ried about potential liability for a section 9 “take,” came forward to 
voice concerns and offer an innovative solution. 
II.  ADDING INCENTIVES TO THE ESA 
A. Background 
1. Habitat Conservation Plans 
In 1982, a high profile development project worth between $500 
and $750 million was pending on San Bruno Mountain in San Mateo 
 
 9. 16 U.S.C. §1538 (2000). 
 10. 16 U.S.C. §1532 (2000). 
 11. 50 C.F.R. 17.3 (2002). 
 12. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (2000). 
 13. Id. § 1540(b). 
 14. Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 of Private Landowners, 
24 ENVTL. L. 419, 475 (Spring 1994) (citing Endangered Species Act hearings on Endangered 
Species Act Reauthorization and Oversight Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries, 97th Cong. 2d 
Sess. 426-27 (1982) (prepared statement of Patrick A. Parenteau, Vice President for Conserva-
tion, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n)). 
 15. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 16. H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2860, 2870. 
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County, California, and the development site included habitat sup-
porting the endangered Mission Blue Butterfly.17 To avert termina-
tion of the project under section 9, the developers and the county, 
with the help of scientists and environmentalists, cooperatively de-
vised a plan to conserve and manage habitat for the butterfly while 
still allowing the development project to continue.18 
Using this new approach as a springboard, Congress acted to 
amend the ESA in 1983 by adding section 10, which provided an ex-
ception to the ESA’s absolute prohibition on “taking” endangered 
species.19 Pursuant to section 10, landowners that wish to develop may 
obtain a permit to “take” members of an endangered species during 
the development process if such taking is “incidental to, and not the 
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”20 In ex-
change for this Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”), the landowner must 
prepare a HCP designed to minimize and mitigate the impact of the 
permitted taking.21 
However, few landowners were motivated to participate in the 
HCP program. Between 1983 and 1994 fewer than 20 HCPs were ap-
proved.22 Landowners were unenthusiastic because of the enormous 
cost of HCPs, regulatory uncertainty, and because there was no as-
surance that the landowner would not be required to undertake more 
mitigation in the future if the HCP did not work as planned.23 
2. The No Surprises Rule 
Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt issued the No 
Surprises policy in 1994.24 This policy allowed the insertion of a provi-
sion in every HCP that if changes to the plan were necessary due to 
 
 17. Wayne King, Builder Stumbles on Potential Foe – Butterflies, N.Y. TIMES, February 6, 
1982, Section 1, Page 1. 
 18. Gidari, supra note 14, at 479 (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN ET. AL., RECONCILING 
CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION 
PLANNING EXPERIENCE 7, 42 (1991)). 
 19. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a) (2000). 
 20. Id. §1539(a)(1)(b). 
 21. Id. §1539(a); 50 C.F.R. §17.3. 
 22. Environmental Defense, Progress on the Back Forty, An Analysis of Three Incentive-
based Approaches to Endangered Species Conservation on Private Land, 17 (Jan. 2000), at 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/150_backforty.PDF. 
 23. Id. at 10-18; Eric Fisher, Comment: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endan-
gered Species Act: No Surprises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 881 (1996). 
 24. See Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook (Draft), 59 Fed. 
Reg. 65782 (December 21, 1994) (first publishing No Surprises policy in draft form). The policy 
was then codified and issued as a final rule in 1998. 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998), available 
at http://endangered.fws.gov/r/f980223.pdf. 
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unforeseen circumstances, the landowner would not be required to 
pay for the implementation of those changes.25 Landowners appar-
ently appreciated the added certainty that the No Surprises policy 
provided. In the years between 1985 and 1994, before the No Sur-
prises policy was adopted, a total of thirty-nine HCPs were ap-
proved.26 In 1995 alone, a total of 86 HCPs were approved,27 and by 
the end of 1999, 274 plans had been approved.28 The stimulus for HCP 
creation provided by the No Surprises policy is irrefutable. The wis-
dom of the policy is still debated, however, and recently the No Sur-
prises Rule was remanded for further proceedings consistent with sec-
tion 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act.29 
B. Evaluating the New Incentive-Based Approaches 
1. Evaluating Section 10 
The addition of section 10 represented a departure from the 
“stick” approach originally manifest in the ESA, in favor of a more 
progressive “carrot” approach. Rather than deterring actions that 
harm members of an endangered species through the threat of severe 
civil or criminal sanctions, Congress made an exception to the ESA 
with the intent of actually increasing endangered species conserva-
tion. Section 10 was intended to “ . . . encourage creative partnerships 
between the public and private sectors, and among governmental 
agencies in the interest of species and habitat conservation.”30 It 
sought to accomplish such creative partnerships by permitting the 
Secretary to authorize a take otherwise prohibited by section 9 if it is 
incidental to an otherwise lawful activity and the developer submits a 
conservation plan to minimize and mitigate the extent of the take.31 In 
order to provide sufficient incentives for private developers to make 
use of this provision, Congress intended for the secretary to make as-
surances that the section 10 permit would be in effect for the life of 
 
 25. Id. at 8860; see U.S. Fish and Wildlife and National Marine Fisheries Service, Habitat 
Conservation Plan (No Surprises) Assurances Final Rule, available at http://endangered. 
fws.gov/hcp/nosurpr.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 26. Environmental Defense, supra note 22, 17 . 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 30. H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2860, 2872. 
 31. Id. at 2870. 
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the project, even if it spans 30 or more years.32 The rationale Congress 
apparently followed was simple—a carrot will work better than a 
stick. Landowners were often practicing the “shoot, shovel, and shut-
up” method of avoiding liability by destroying endangered species 
and habitat on their land before the existence of such species and 
habitat were discovered by federal authorities.33 Congress hoped to 
reduce this practice and assuage landowners’ section 9 fears through 
the HCP and No Surprises process. Was Congress’ rationale sound? 
A simple thought experiment involving role-playing will explain 
where incentives lie under section 10. 
a. Incentives under Section 10 
As a starting point consider that prior to section 10’s enactment 
the landowner whose development actions would take an endangered 
species had a choice between either refraining from developing or de-
veloping and hoping he did not get caught violating the Act.34 A ra-
tional landowner would make his decision by weighing the economic 
gain possible through development minus the sanction that would re-
sult from violation of the Act, discounted by the probability of getting 
caught violating it, against his affinity for endangered species. 
Suppose: 
D is the economic gain from development; 
S is the magnitude of the sanction incurred for violating the Act35; 
P is the probability of getting caught violating the Act; 
A ithe affinity the landowner has for endangered species. 
The landowner’s thought process can be represented in the fol-
lowing equation: 
If D-(S x P) > A then the landowner will “shoot, shovel, and 
shut-up”; 
If D-(S x P) < A then the landowner will not develop. 
Now consider how section 10 changes the equation. 
 
 32. Id. at 2872. 
 33. Albert C. Lin, Comment, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans 
and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 382 (1996). 
 34. Jonathan Nash discusses the ways in which the ESA actually creates incentives to de-
stroy habitat rather than preserve it. See Jonathan R. Nash, Ecosystems and Endangered Spe-
cies, Markets and Geography: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author). 
 35. See Joshua G. Eagle & David R. Betters, The Endangered Species Act and Economic 
Values: A Comparison of Fines and Contingent Valuation Studies, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 165 
(1998) (arguing that the fines imposed by the ESA are too low to capture the marginal social 
damage incurred with each ‘taking’ of a threatened or endangered species). 
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First, suppose the landowner values endangered species, and 
would never dream of harming them. This landowner will have incen-
tive to avoid any development on her land that could potentially 
harm an endangered species. She will not be interested in obtaining 
an ITP because she would not want to take an endangered species 
even incidentally. Hence, section 10 will have no effect on this land-
owner’s incentives. She will not develop her land. 
Second, suppose the landowner has a mild affinity for endan-
gered species, but cares slightly more about the economic gain he can 
obtain from developing his land. The landowner will have incentive to 
develop even when doing so will harm an endangered species. The 
threat of sanctions for violating the ESA will also influence what this 
landowner wishes to do. Suppose: 
D is the economic gain to be had through development; 
S is the magnitude of the sanction that the landowner faces if 
caught violating the Act; 
P is the probability of getting caught violating the Act; 
A is the affinity for the endangered species; 
and C is the cost of creating and maintaining an HCP. 
The interplay of these various incentives can be represented by 
the following equations: 
If D-(S x P) > (A+D-C) then the landowner will “shoot, shovel, 
and shut-up”; 
If D-(S x P) < (A+D-C) then the landowner will create an HCP. 
Note how the equation has changed with the addition of section 
10. There is an additional cost (C), that of the HCP, on the right side 
of the equation, but there is also a major additional benefit (D); the 
economic gain to be had by being able to develop despite the inciden-
tal impact to endangered species. 
These equations also accurately describe the incentives and ac-
tions of a landowner who is ambivalent about endangered species but 
appreciates very much the economic benefits of development. In such 
an instance A will be zero but C will still be positive, leaving “D-C” 
on the right side of the equation. In such an instance the landowner 
will create an HCP if the economic gain from development minus the 
cost of an HCP outweighs the benefit of development minus the po-
tential sanctions. Likewise, the incentives of a landowner that hates 
endangered species can be represented in these equations; in such an 
instance A would be negative. 
One would reasonably expect some landowners who were ini-
tially scared away from developing by the sanctions imposed by the 
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ESA to apply for an ITP and create an HCP. One also would rea-
sonably expect some landowners who decided to destroy the species 
and/or habitat, at the risk of getting caught, to apply for an ITP and 
create an HCP. In this respect, section 10 appears to be an improve-
ment over the ESA as originally enacted in 1973.36 
b. HCP Performance 
But what about the HCPs themselves? What are the incentives of 
the various parties when the terms of an HCP are being negotiated? 
If the landowner values endangered species she will have incen-
tive to create terms as beneficial to the endangered species as possi-
ble. If the landowner is ambivalent toward endangered species, or ac-
tively dislikes them, he has incentive to create terms as economically 
advantageous as possible, irrespective of the impact on such species. 
The other party to the HCP negotiation, the FWS or NMFS rep-
resentative, may have varied incentives as well. She may value endan-
gered species, and demand terms in the HCP as beneficial for them as 
possible. She may not value the endangered species as much as the 
proposed land use and seek terms that, while consistent with her gov-
ernment mandate, are as beneficial to the landowner as possible. Re-
sources play a big role in the negotiation as well. If it costs a great 
deal of money to ensure that the most beneficial terms for the species 
are in the HCP and that same amount of money could be used in an-
other way to benefit endangered species more efficiently, the FWS 
representative who values endangered species may have incentive not 
to seek the terms most beneficial to the species. 
In practice, HCPs have enjoyed a few notable successes and a 
number of abysmal failures. Critics have pointed out that studies 
show that most HCPs lack a basic scientific foundation.37 In fact, fun-
damental biological information such as average life span and rates of 
change in population size was unknown for at least 80 percent of the 
HCP-protected species examined.38 In addition, HCPs are reactive 
because they involve mitigation of the effects of development pro-
 
 36. This, of course, does not mean that there could not have been any other changes that 
would have been more of an improvement. 
 37. Peter Kareiva et al., Using Science In Habitat Conservation Plans, National Center for 
Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-web/projects/97KAREI2/ 
hcp-1999-01-14.pdf (Jan 14, 1999) . 
 38. Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Many Habitat Conservation Plans Found to Lack Key Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at F3. 
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jects, and not movement toward the recovery of the endangered spe-
cies.39 
[T]he old adage that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure’ is applicable to species protection programs. . . . Preventative 
measures. . .are likely to be more cost-effective because they pro-
tect multiple species simultaneously. The odds are that the ESA 
will achieve greater success and better cost-effectiveness by improv-
ing its emphasis on proactive approaches. . . . .40 
Hence, a preventative approach that focuses more on species recov-
ery, rather than mitigation of new harms alone, would improve the ef-
ficacy of the ESA relative to section 10. Additionally, HCPs are ex-
tremely expensive, burdensome, and fraught with delay.41 
Landowners also reported that, without the No Surprises Rule, HCPs 
entailed excessive uncertainty.42 
Nevertheless, HCPs represented a potential improvement over 
the strict taking prohibition because they required the engagement of 
private landowners in the conservation effort. This involvement of 
landowners cannot only increase the resources available for endan-
gered species protection because landowners would be using some of 
their own private funds in the effort, 43 but their involvement can also 
make it easier to protect the large percentage of endangered species 
that inhabit private land. 
2. Evaluating the No Surprises Rule 
The No Surprises Rule was an answer to “. . . the absence of 
adequate incentives for non-Federal landowners to factor endangered 
species conservation into their day-to-day land management activi-
ties.”44 It was a clearer articulation of the assurances that landowners 
expected to obtain through long-term section 10 permits.45 The Ser-
vices46 felt that providing additional assurances would increase the use 
 
 39. See 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2)(B)(2) (2000) (describing that a permit recipient must act to 
minimize and mitigate the impact of his or her development). 
 40. Jason F. Shogren, et al., Why Economics Matter for Endangered Species Protection and 
the ESA, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1257, 1259-60 (1999). 
 41. Environmental Defense, supra note 22, 10-18; see Lin, supra note 33, at 395-406. 
 42. Environmental Defense, supra note 22, 17-18. 
 43. Gardner M. Brown Jr. and Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species 
Act, 12 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 3. 
 44. Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 23, 1998). 
 45. Id. 
 46. The National Oceanic and Atmoshpheric Administration and National Marine Fisher-
ies Service under the Department of Commerice, and the Fish and Wildlife Service under De-
partment of the Interior jointly have responsibility for administering the ESA and for promul-
gating regulations pursuant to the statute. 
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of HCPs, which Congress in turn thought “could provide early protec-
tion for many unlisted species and, ideally, prevent subsequent de-
clines and, in some cases, the need to list covered species.”47 The No 
Surprises Rule dramatically increased the number of HCPs, but ques-
tions remain as to how effective it was in actually promoting conser-
vation of endangered species. 
a. Incentives under the No Surprises Rule 
The No Surprises Rule was intended to provide landowners with 
further incentive to engage in the HCP process. It did so by reducing 
the cost of creating and maintaining an HCP (both financially and 
emotionally) because with regulatory certainty a landowner could 
comfortably make long-term investment and management decisions 
without the fear that such investments and decisions might prove fu-
tile. Recall that the incentives driving the landowners’ actions can be 
represented as follows: 
D is the economic gain obtained through development; 
S is the magnitude of the sanction that the landowner faces if 
caught violating the Act; 
P is the probability of getting caught violating the Act; 
A is the affinity for the endangered species; 
and C is the cost of creating and maintaining an HCP. 
The interplay of these various incentives can be represented by 
the following equations: 
If D-(S x P) > (A+D-C) then the landowner will “shoot, shovel, 
and shut-up”; 
If D-(S x P) < (A+D-C) then the landowner will create an HCP. 
Consider these same equations under the No Surprises Rule. 
Suppose that: 
N is the reduction in cost afforded by the No Surprises Rule. The 
equations will then be as follows: 
If D-(S x P) > (A+D-[C-N]) then the landowner will “shoot, 
shovel, and shut-up”; 
If D-(S x P) < (A+D-[C-N]) then the landowner will create an 
HCP. 
With reduced costs, landowners do have a greater incentive to 
engage in the HCP process. But there are side-effects. With the addi-
tion of No Surprises assurances in all HCPs, a perverse result 
emerges. Landowners, not wanting their HCP management activities 
 
 47. 63 Fed. Reg. at 8860. 
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scrutinized, have no incentive to report unforeseen circumstances to 
the FWS.48 Likewise, under the No Surprises Rule the FWS is unable 
to make the landowner pay for any necessary changes due to unfore-
seen circumstances.49 The agency is unable to make changes itself, 
even if it is aware that changes are needed, as a result of chronic un-
der-funding.50 The FWS therefore has incentive to skirt monitoring 
obligations that would alert the Service (agency) to the need for 
changes. Even if the FWS were well intentioned and wanted to pro-
tect endangered species to the maximum extent possible, given its 
limited resources the agency might rationally chose to forgo address-
ing unforeseen circumstances in order to spend money on conserva-
tion of other, yet un-addressed endangered species. 
b. No Surprises Rule Performance 
Although the No Surprises Rule clearly led to a dramatic in-
crease in HCPs,51 it was criticized by environmentalists as hindering 
endangered species recovery.52 In fact, Spirit of the Sage Council sued 
the servicesclaiming not only that the No Surprises Rule (and the at-
tendant Permit Revocation Rule53) was promulgated in violation of 
the APA’s section 553 notice and comment rulemaking requirement, 
 
 48. Unless the Fish and Wildlife Service discover some aspect of the landowners manage-
ment activities that had not been undertaken precisely as outlined in the often complicated 
terms of the HCP. 
 49. 63 Fed. Reg. at 8860. 
 50. See Lin, supra note 33, at 381 (describing the FWS as understaffed and underfunded); 
see also Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an 
Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 264 (1998) (likewise de-
scribing the FWS as understaffed and underfunded). 
 51. Environmental Defense, supra note 22, at 17 . 
 52. See, e.g., Spirit of the Sage Council, The “No Surprises” Campaign, at http://www.sage 
council.com/noSur1.html (last visited May 19, 2004) (discussing the negative affect of the No 
Surprises Rule on endangered species). 
 53. The Permit Revocation Rule was promulgated in 1999, during the pendency of the No 
Surprises Rule litigation, and states that a Section 10 permit “may not be revoked . . . unless 
continuation of the permitted activity would be inconsistent with the criterion set forth in 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv),” and unless the “inconsistency has not been remedied [by the Ser-
vices] in a timely fashion.” Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 
2003) (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 32,712, 32,714). 
(June. 17, 1999) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b), 17.32(b)). 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) es-
tablishes as a condition for a permit that “the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood 
of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.” The Permit Revocation Rule therefore 
allows the Services to revoke a Section 10 permit if unforeseen circumstances arise and the Ser-
vices are unable to pay to accommodate them. This led the plaintiff to quip that the No Sur-
prises Rule has become the “Some Surprises Rule”. The Permit Revocation Rule clearly does 
remove some of the certainty afforded by the No Surprises Rule – which was the reason for the 
Rule. 
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but also that it is contrary to the language and purpose of the ESA it-
self.54 Under the No Surprises Rule, in the event that changes are nec-
essary due to unforeseen circumstances, the Services’ ability to make 
those changes will be “dependant on the availability of appropriated 
funds.”55 Spirit of the Sage Council argued that the federal govern-
ment allocates more money for building a single mile of highway than 
it does to the annual budget for ESA enforcement.56 This suggests 
that in the event of unforeseen circumstances, necessary funds may be 
unavailable if the federal government decided to devote its own re-
sources to making changes the landowner would no longer be obli-
gated to make under the No Surprises Rule.57 
The plaintiffs prevailed in Spirit of the Sage and was remanded 
the No Surprises Rule for further proceedings consistent with section 
553 of the APA.58 The judge did not reach the question of whether the 
No Surprises Rule is contrary to the ESA itself. However, he did hint 
at an answer when he failed to reach the merits of whether the No 
Surprises Rule was consistent with the ESA “because the government 
explicitly relies on the [Permit Revocation Rule] to bolster its conten-
tion that the No Surprises Rule is consistent with the requirements of 
the ESA . . . .”59 If the Permit Revocation Rule, which reduces cer-
tainty, is necessary to prevent the No Surprises Rule from being con-
trary to the ESA, then the assurances of certainty that make the No 
Surprises Rule attractive to landowners may be precisely the feature 
that runs contrary to the ESA. One thing is certain: the status of the 
No Surprises Rule is in flux,60 and even if it is reissued after proper 
APA notice and comment, it may be found contrary to the ESA. As a 
result, a new method of encouraging private landowner participation 
is needed. 
 
 54. See Spirit of the Sage Council, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
 55. 63 Fed. Reg. at 8864. 
 56. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 38, 
Spirit of the Sage Council v. Babbitt, No. 1:98CV01873(EGS) (D.D.C. filed May 15, 2002). 
 57. Id. (quoting 63 Fed. Reg. 8864). 
 58. Spirit of the Sage Council, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 92. 
 59. Id. at 85. 
 60. Strangely, the Services appear to be continuing to issue Section 10 permits with No 
Surprises Assurances, despite not having reconsidered it yet. See Memorandum from Steven 
Williams, Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to the Regional Directors, Region 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, Manager, California/Nevada Operations Office (Jan. 28, 2004), available at 
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/NoSurprises/memo1.pdf (last visited May 19, 2004). 
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PART II:  CONSERVATION BANKS 
Generally, there are three different types of mitigation repre-
sented in HCPs,61 two of which will be discussed here. First, individual 
landowners may employ conservation measures on their own land 
that are intended to minimize and mitigate the extent of the inciden-
tal take.62 These mitigation measures may be undertaken either adja-
cent to the development, or “off-site.” 
The second type of mitigation involves the establishment and 
management by third parties of off-site land parcels for mitigation ef-
forts. The third party could be a local government, which would pay 
for mitigation efforts with assessments levied against the developers 
on whose behalf the off-site mitigation parcels are established.63 Third 
parties might also be private citizens who establish “mitigation 
banks,”64 also called “conservation banks.” Third parties then sell 
“credits” to developers representing the conservation value of the 
land making up a mitigation bank in order to offset the harm caused 
by development.65 The credits are recognized by the appropriate regu-
latory authority as representing the mitigation necessary to justify is-
suing an ITP.66 To have credits recognized, the third party that owns 
the conservation bank and sells the credits that the bank generates 
must have undertaken some action to enhance species health.67 Typi-
cally this entails some sort of preservation, creation, restoration, or 
enhancement of habitat.68 
Conservation banks represent a new approach to endangered 
species management that has the potential to dramatically improve 
the plight of endangered species while radically reducing the cost of 
doing so. Recognizing this potential, the U.S. Department of the Inte-
rior recently released Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Op-
 
 61. See Micheal J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species 
Conservation Tool, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10537, 10546 (July 2000) (describing three approaches 
taken in HCPs, one of which involves the participation of local governments, which will not be 
addressed in this paper). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. Mitigation efforts made by government agencies on behalf of developers will not be 
discussed in this paper primarily because the incentives normally present with mitigation pro-
jects owned by governments are different than the incentives present when mitigation projects 
are owned by private third parties. Private third parties have incentive to profit from selling 
credits. Governments have no such motive because they are not selling any credits. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. As will be argued infra, mitigation banking need not be restricted solely to habitat. 
 68. Id. 
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eration of Conservation Banks to provide “a collaborative incentive-
based approach to endangered species conservation, which if used in 
coordination with other tools available to the service, can aid in the 
recovery of species.”69 But can conservation banks live up to their po-
tential? 
I.  THE ADVANTAGES OF CONSERVATION BANKS 
A. Incentives under Conservation Banks 
The most fundamental reason why conservation banks have 
enormous potential is that their use turns the standard incentive sce-
nario on its head. Initially, the presence of an endangered species rep-
resented a tremendous cost because it could halt development en-
tirely. With the addition of section 10, the presence of an endangered 
species did not halt development but was still a tremendous cost at-
tendant to development. With the addition of the No Surprises Rule, 
the presence of endangered species became a slightly lower cost at-
tendant to development. With conservation banks, however, the 
presence of an endangered species “provides an opportunity to gen-
erate income from what may have previously been considered a liabil-
ity.”70 
If one accepts the base assumption that a private landowner or 
developer is motivated primarily by the desire to make money, the 
first advantage of a conservation bank-centered approach becomes 
obvious. Normally, when the landowner is required to create an HCP 
in order to continue development, the HCP process will be viewed as 
a means to develop, and thereby make money. A prudent business-
person would seek to minimize the costs of all means of achieving de-
velopment, including the HCP process. Hence, the developer has in-
centive to create the most inexpensive HCP possible. Land itself is 
very expensive, and therefore the developer has incentive to minimize 
the quantity of land set aside in an HCP. The only limit to how small 
and inexpensive a developer would want an HCP to be is what the 
FWS (or other Service) would be willing to approve. The No Sur-
prises Rule also assures that no landowner will be required to allocate 
more land or spend more money for an HCP in the event of unfore-
seen circumstances. Landowners therefore have no incentive to in-
clude within their HCPs a margin of error beyond the minimum re-
 
 69. Hogan, supra note 3. 
 70. Hogan, supra note 3, Guidance at 1. 
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quired by the FWS. The resulting small patchworks of habitat set 
aside for endangered species usually will fail to fulfill potential be-
cause a single large reserve is generally better, in terms of species re-
covery, than multiple small reserves.71 
Of course, if the FWS simply required that HCPs be exhaustively 
comprehensive in order to be approved, this problem might not exist. 
The purpose of the HCP process, however, is to encourage landown-
ers to participate in species conservation efforts,72 and to use some of 
their own resources in doing so. The No Surprises Rule was used to 
further foster private landowner participation,73 but if the hurdles that 
must be surmounted to obtain an ITP are too great, landowners will 
have little incentive to participate.74 Instead, they could turn to the 
“shoot, shovel, and shut up” approach.75 The near total lack of land-
owner participation in the HCP process prior to the addition of the 
No Surprises Rule demonstrates this fact clearly. 
The use of conservation banks, however, fundamentally changes 
the character of the foundational premise that landowners seek to 
make money, and therefore have incentive to save money at the ex-
pense of species protection. While the owner of a conservation bank 
still seeks to make money, the way the owner does so is by ensuring 
the endangered species at issue thrives on the property.76 The more ef-
fective the species recovery on the property, the more a landowner 
can charge for the corresponding conservation bank credits. Recall 
that with HCPs, the incentives driving landowners can be represented 
as follows: 
D is the economic gain to be had through development; 
S is the magnitude of the sanction that the landowner faces if 
caught violating the Act; 
P is the probability of getting caught violating the Act; 
 
 71. See Jared Diamond, The Island Dilemma: Lessons of Modern Biogeographic Studies for 
the Design of Natural Reserves, 7 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 129-146 (1975). 
 72. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE DIVISION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES & NATIONAL 
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE OFFICE OF PROTECTED RESOURCES, MAKING THE ESA WORK 
BETTER, 7 (June 1997). 
 73. 63 Fed. Reg. 8860 (Feb 23, 1998). 
 74. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Apples for Oranges: The Role of Currencies in Environ-
mental Trading Markets, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11438, 11448 (Dec. 2001). 
 75. John Merrifield, A Market Approach to Conserving Biodiversity, 16 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 217, 217 (1996). 
 76. Supposing that the value of the credits, as determined by the FWS, takes this into ac-
count. This is unfortunately not always the case, since most existing conservation banks now 
involve the trade of habitat, as discussed infra. 
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A is the affinity for the endangered species; 
and C is the cost of creating and maintaining an HCP. 
The interplay of these various incentives can be represented by 
the following equations: 
If D-(S x P) > (A+D-C) then the landowner will “shoot, shovel, 
and shut-up”; 
If D-(S x P) < (A+D-C) then the landowner will create an HCP. 
With conservation banks the equation stays the same except that 
C is the cost of purchasing conservation banking permits that allow 
incidental takes. 
Hence, if D-(S x P) < (A+D-C) then the landowner will purchase 
conservation bank permits. 
But here an additional equation comes into play. The landowner 
must also ask herself if development is really the most profitable op-
tion. If the landowner can turn her property into a conservation bank 
and make more money selling permits, she would be wise to forgo 
development. 
Suppose, in addition to the terms above, that: 
$ is the money to be made converting the property into a conser-
vation bank and selling credits; and 
Z is the cost of operating the conservation bank. 
If D-C > A+($-Z) then the landowner will develop the land. 
If D-C < A+($-Z) then the landowner will turn the land into a 
conservation bank. 
B. The Significance of the Incentives Presented by Conservation 
Banks 
The different incentives present with conservation banks create 
interesting results. Unlike HCPs, conservation banks are designed to 
generate income through the protection of endangered and threat-
ened species and the habitats on which they depend and are not seen 
as a means to circumvent a strict statutory obligation. Therefore, con-
servation banks are much more likely to protect endangered and 
threatened species than are HCPs. Furthermore, because the conser-
vation bank owner stands to gain from endangered species health, he 
will have incentive to carefully monitor the status of the endangered 
species on his property, unlike the landowner and FWS in an HCP ar-
rangement that includes No Surprises assurances. 
Because conservation bank owners stand to benefit if endan-
gered species on the property thrive, they have incentive to use the 
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best scientific data available when creating the plan to preserve spe-
cies. For example, a single large reserve is generally better than sev-
eral small ones.77 This is exactly the basis on which conservation bank-
ing was founded. Conservation banks provide for the protection of 
several continuous tracts of “high-priority habitat,” with the condition 
that each section of the bank “must be large enough to be ecologically 
self-sustaining.”78 HCPs with on-site mitigation, on the other hand, 
create a patchwork of small, isolated ecosystems. This is an ineffective 
way to protect species as “[i]solated mitigation projects that have lit-
tle connection with their surrounding ecosystem often are more prone 
to failure than a mitigation project that is incorporated into a larger, 
ecosystem-based conservation bank or regional conservation plan.”79 
The incentives associated with conservation banking mean that basic 
ecological principles are more effectively incorporated into the design 
of conservation banks than they are into the design of HCPs that in-
clude on-site mitigation. 
The numerous steps involved in designing an HCP that includes 
on-site mitigation are extremely time-consuming and expensive. On 
average, this process can cost anywhere from $50,000 to $100,000 per 
year.80 Conservation banking, on the other hand, offers a “market-
based approach [that] provides greater environmental protection at a 
lower cost.”81 
The concept of conservation banking is based on the fundamen-
tal economic theory that things will be valued if they have value in the 
market place. HCPs in general do not create any sort of market value 
for the protection of listed species, as listed species are viewed essen-
tially as a liability rather than an asset. As an example, many land-
owners used to partake in the “shoot, shovel, and shut up” practice to 
avoid detection of a listed species on their property and the resulting 
strict regulation and potential property devaluation.82 Conservation 
 
 77. Diamond, supra note 71, at 129. 
 78. Hogan, supra note 3, at 1; The Resources Agency of California, Market Created for 
Habitat Improvements; “Conservation Banks” Integrate Environmental, Economic Goals, The 
California Environmental Resources Evaluation System: A Catalogue of Conservation Banks in 
California, Apr. 7, 1995, at http://ceres.ca.gov/topic/conservation/april_press_release.html. 
 79. A Report of The California Resources Agency and the Department of Fish and Game, 
A Catalogue of Conservation Banks in California: Innovative Tools for Natural Resource Man-
agement, June 1996, at 8. 
 80. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the 
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 304 (1998). 
 81. The Resources Agency of California, supra note 78 (quoting James M. Strock). 
 82. Merrifield, supra note 75, at 217. 
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banking credits actually have the opposite effect; they make “protec-
tion of habitat an economic asset.”83 The more endangered species 
present within a conservation bank, and the more the populations of 
these species thrive in that area, the more valuable the credits offered 
by that conservation bank will be.84 This creates a strong incentive for 
conservation bank owners to turn their land into endangered species 
wildlife preserves and do everything within their power to ensure that 
endangered species thrive. 
Conservation banking “allows landowners to recoup a higher 
value for their land, which would otherwise be constrained due to en-
vironmental considerations.”85 As of 1996, thirty-nine conservation 
banks were either established or in the process of being established in 
the state of California, comprising a total land value of at least $40 
million.86 
C. Additional Advantages of Conservation Banks 
Conservation banks provide further advantages over HCPs. As 
with tradable permits under the Clean Air Act, credits can be pur-
chased by anyone. A non-profit organization wanting to protect a 
particular species could purchase several credits, resulting in the per-
manent protection of that species. The HCP process does not allow 
for this. Individuals who want to protect a listed species can do so 
only by putting pressure on the developer not to develop his or her 
land, typically through litigation. The conservation banking process, 
however, allows for non-developers to take a proactive approach to 
species protection without creating conflict between economic and 
environmental interests. 
Conservation banks could be incorporated into large mutual 
fund-like conservation-backed portfolios for investment. These con-
servation bank “mutual funds,” which incorporate many different 
parcels possibly owned by many different owners, could hedge risks 
 
 83. A Report of the California Resources Agency and the Department of Fish and Game, 
A Catalogue of Conservation Banks in California: Innovative Tools for Natural Resource Man-
agement, June 1996, at 9. 
 84. Supposing that the value of the credits, as determined by the FWS, takes this into ac-
count. This is unfortunately not always the case, since most existing conservation banks now 
involve the trade of habitat, as discussed infra. 
 85. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the 
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 304 (1998). 
 86. A Report of The California Resources Agency and the Department of Fish and Game, 
A Catalogue of Conservation Banks in California: Innovative Tools for Natural Resource Man-
agement, June 1996, at 1. 
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across these parcels and create a sound investment for individuals 
who may have no interest in endangered species themselves. 
Conservation banks are also compatible with other uses outside 
of species conservation. For example, the land used for a conservation 
bank could support recreational opportunities, and Native American 
reservation land could be used for conservation banks, providing a 
source of income for Native American residents. Environmental or-
ganizations can use donated funds to start conservation banks and 
then use the money generated from credit sales to fund other conser-
vation efforts. Universities could also participate in conservation 
banking processes allowing them to test or refine habitat and ecosys-
tem management techniques. 
A final economic advantage to conservation banking is that it al-
lows valuable habitat to be protected in perpetuity. When all the 
credits from a particular bank are sold, that property will be perma-
nently managed as a wildlife reserve.87 Most HCPs, however, contain 
contractual clauses allowing expiration within a specified number of 
years. Unless additional action is taken, the species protected in an 
HCP with such a provision will once again be put at risk. 
II.  POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH CONSERVATION BANKS 
Despite conservation banks’ enormous potential, there are a 
number of problems that conservation banking schemes must over-
come. Many of these problems are unique to the conservation bank-
ing framework and, therefore, vary across different conservation bank 
structures. One major problem, however, is endemic to conservation 
banks in general: the inevitable tradeoff between currency adequacy 
and the robustness of the market. 
A. Currency 
James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl first address the currency used in 
environmental trading markets.88 Some environmental trading 
schemes have been very successful. The SO2 permit trading system, 
for example, has dramatically reduced SO2 pollution.
89 The SO2 per-
 
 87. Id. at 8; Hogan, supra note 3, at 12. 
 88. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11439.  
 89. See Dallas Burtraw & Bryan Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the 
Clear Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, 26 ELR 10411 (Aug. 1996) (demonstrating that the SO2 
trading program has resulted in over-compliance as evidenced by a SO2 emissions in 1995 that 
were 40% less than what was permitted by law and that compliance costs were estimated to be 
up to 40% lower than what a similar reduction would have cost under a command and control 
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mit trading system uses a single common currency, however—tons of 
SO2 emitted. Because two different tons of SO2 have the same pollut-
ing potential, they are fungible, and can be traded easily with no cor-
rective market mechanisms.90 
Environmental trading markets for wetland mitigation banks and 
habitat conservation banks are different. Ideally, one would want a 
common unit of exchange that captures all externalities involved. For 
example, when mitigating wetland development by buying credits for 
wetland restoration elsewhere, we want the trade to capture both the 
wetland water filtration capabilities and flood control capabilities. If 
the trading currency captures one capability but not the other, the 
missing feature is an externality that, having not been captured, leads 
to an inefficient and inequitable trade. 
Salzman and Ruhl point out that most observers view the value 
of the environment anthropocentrically; that is the value of environ-
mental protection stems from how it affects humans in a positive 
way.91 Because this is the case, “the ideal currency would likely be a 
measure of social value.”92 So far, so good, but a problem arises when 
one attempts to determine what the social value is for any particular 
environmental good. Of the myriad of environmental problems that 
society is attempting deal with, cancer risk is one for which we have 
the most information, yet an accurate quantification of cancer risk has 
proven illusive due to technological constraints.93 Ecological risk is 
even more difficult to quantify.94 So instead we use proxy measures to 
approximate the social value of preventing environmental harm.95 The 
currency used in environmental trading markets is accurate only inso-
far as it serves as an effective proxy for the environmental values the 
market is trying to provide.96 
 
regime); see also Richard Schmalansee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions 
Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 64 (1998) (estimating that savings under the SO2 permitting 
program totaled between $225 and $375 million annually). 
 90. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11439.  Of course, tons of SO2 emitted are only per-
fectly fungible to the extent that their reallocation does not create “hot spots” in which certain 
communities are subject to increasing SO2 levels despite the overall decrease. Jonathan Remy 
Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to 
Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569-661 (2001). 
 91. Id. at 11443. 
 92. Id. 
 93. ENVTL. PROECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, 98-99 (1987). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11443-44. 
 96. Id. at 11443-44. 
092804 MILLS.DOC 10/12/2004  4:27 PM 
2004] CAN CONSERVATION BANKING LIVE UP TO POTENTIAL? 543 
To assign units based on social value we must first have an idea 
of what social value endangered species protection provides. While it 
is easy to conceptualize the value of reducing particulate matter in 
terms of reductions in asthma, and it is even possible to conceptualize 
the value of wetlands for water filtration and flood control, it is much 
harder to understand the value of endangered species habitat because 
the loss of endangered species habitat may have little or no bearing 
on human health. One might reasonably presume this is even truer of 
endangered species themselves, rather than just their habitat, because 
habitat can at least provide ecosystem services such as water filtration 
or flood control. Certainly there are benefits to biodiversity preserva-
tion: 
The costs and benefits [of biodiversity] include the following: the 
benefits of pharmaceutical and agricultural products derived from 
naturally occurring genetic resources; the aesthetic benefits; the 
“option value” in preserving stocks of biological resources for yet-
undreamed-of future uses; the “existence value”; and the insurance 
value of diverse and healthy ecosystems as a prophylactic against, 
and reserve resource pool in the event of, catastrophic disturbances 
or “crashes” that could make human life immeasurably more diffi-
cult.97 
Unfortunately, all of these benefits are either speculative or ex-
tremely difficult to measure, which makes quantifying the value of 
biodiversity, and the ESA, virtually impossible. To make an environ-
mental trading market for endangered species protection work, there-
fore, we must rely on proxies, most of which fail to capture external-
ities that nonetheless have social value.98 For example, trading 
development of endangered species habitat for preservation of habi-
tat elsewhere can fail to capture the value that the developed habitat 
had as part of a contiguous habitat system for the species, as part of a 
system in which other species interacted to the benefit of the endan-
gered species, and as habitat that has reached a level of vegetative 
maturity suitable for the species.99 We need a quantifiable proxy for 
social value that captures externalities. This has proved illusive, and 
instead we have simply arbitrarily concluded that protecting endan-
gered species has social value (without determining how much social 
value), and the more the better. In so doing the equivalency of trades 
can be established by equating the amount of endangered species pro-
tection gained at the conservation bank and that lost at the develop-
 
 97. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CNLLR 1, 74 (1997). 
 98. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11448-49. 
 99. Id. at 11444 (chart 1). 
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ment site. How well the currency we choose serves as a proxy for the 
socially valuable endangered species protection depends on the fun-
gibility of the units being traded.100 
There are many nonfungibilities101 in environmental trading mar-
kets, particularly in the case of wetland mitigation banks and habitat 
conservation banks, which makes the task of identifying an adequate 
currency for habitat conservation banking more difficult. Salzman 
and Ruhl identify three different types of nonfungibles that can arise: 
nonfungibles of space, of type, and of time.102 Nonfungibilities of 
space involve the geographical anomalies of a trade that make the 
trade inequitable. Salzman and Ruhl give the example of wetland 
ecosystem functions.103 When a wetland developer buys credits at a 
wetland mitigation bank off-site, the newly created (or restored, or 
preserved) wetland will likely be in a geographical location where 
land is cheaper than the location that the developer seeks to develop 
(if this were not the case, it would not be economically advantageous 
to engage in the trade). The cheaper land is often in rural areas. This 
means that the ecosystem functions provided by wetlands, such as wa-
ter filtration and flood control, have been moved from an area where 
they serve a large populace to an area where they serve a small one.104 
The trade of the urban wetland for the rural wetland proves to be in-
equitable, and hence the currency nonfungible. 
Although Salzman and Ruhl argue the same is true for habitat 
conservation banks because, for example, “lost habitat may have 
been part of a contiguous habitat system for the species, whereas the 
preserved habitat may be isolated and thus of less overall value,”105 
there are no spatial nonfungibilities with endangered species. A com-
parison with the wetland mitigation bank trade above will make this 
clear. With wetland mitigation banking, the wetland preserved in the 
mitigation bank still provided the full range of ecosystem services, but 
the location of those ecosystem services has changed such that differ-
ent (and often fewer) people can take advantage of them. This sort of 
nonfungibility of space does not occur with endangered species: 
 
 100. Id. at 11444-46. 
 101. The fungibility of any particular currency is usually a matter of degree, rather than sim-
ply being fungible or nonfungible. For simplicity’s sake, however, this paper will treat fungibility 
as binary. 
 102. Id. at 11444. 
 103. Id. at 11444, chart 1. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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[I]f the ESA’s goal is to improve the survival prospects of a species 
sufficiently that it can be considered recovered, that goal is to some 
degree independent of where a species is found today. Although 
endangered species offer significant local benefits, the ESA is not 
principally concerned with those local benefits. Rather, its overrid-
ing concern is that a species be sufficiently secure in enough places 
that it is not likely to become endangered again in the foreseeable 
future. To meet this goal, it may be enough to ensure that species’ 
survival in some, but not all, the localities where it now occurs.106 
The example of spatial nonfungibility that Salzman and Ruhl 
give for habitat conservation banks is actually far more analogous to 
the example they give in the wetland mitigation banking context for a 
nonfungibility of type. Nonfungibilities of type involve trades be-
tween two different items that, because of their different characteris-
tics are not equitable. Salzman and Ruhl give the following example 
in the wetlands mitigation context: “[t]he destroyed wetlands may 
have had a higher capacity or service provision compared to the re-
stored wetlands.”107 When one wetland area is traded for another that 
does not provide the same quantity or quality of ecosystem service, 
there is a nonfungibility of type. This is why the example for habitat 
conservation banks that Salzman and Ruhl give as a nonfungibility of 
space is actually one of type: that meaning, if a parcel of habitat is 
part of a contiguous tract of habitat for a species, it may be better for 
species recovery than what it will be traded. Nonfungibilities of type 
are an important problem that habitat conservation banking pro-
grams must resolve. 
The third nonfungibility is that of time. Wetlands mitigation 
permits often allow wetlands to be developed before the wetlands in 
the mitigation bank are fully capable of producing the same ecosys-
tem functions that are lost in development.108 The trade might be eq-
uitable in the future but not now. The same problem can occur with 
habitat conservation banks. “The lost habitat may have been of ideal 
vegetative maturity for the species, while the preserved habitat may 
require time to achieve that state.”109 The currency for habitat conser-
vation banks must be chosen with care to avoid such nonfungibilities 
of time. 
 
 106. Bean & Dwyer, supra note 61, at 10547. 
 107. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11444, chart 1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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1. Designing a Currency for Habitat Conservation Banks 
Salzman and Ruhl classify currencies into three types. There are 
simple currencies, such as acres for wetland mitigation,110 universal 
currencies, such as money or risk,111 and comprehensive currencies, 
which are designed to capture all attributes relevant to the trade but 
not necessarily reduce those attributes to a single metric.112 For exam-
ple, the Army Corps of Engineers would be using a comprehensive 
currency if, when approving a wetland mitigation bank trade, they ex-
amined water filtration, flood control characteristics, and all other 
relevant attributes of the two wetland parcels being traded in order to 
ensure that the trade was equitable. 
Traditionally, simple currencies have been used not only in wet-
lands mitigation banking but also in habitat conservation banking.113 
Simple currencies have the major advantage of keeping trades simple, 
reducing transaction costs, and ensuring that all parties understand 
the transaction that is taking place.114 If satisfied with the results of us-
ing the simple currency, the government can simply “stand back and 
act as referee,” which saves the resource expenditure of taking a more 
hands-on approach.115 As a result, simple currencies function well in 
environmental trading markets and therefore keep the market ro-
bust.116 This robustness comes at a cost, however. It “gives those who 
design markets an incentive to oversimplify environmental problems 
to make their market mechanisms more workable”117 thereby failing 
to capture all relevant externalities, and therefore fail to ensure equi-
table trades.118 
Universal currencies reduce all attributes of the items being 
traded to a common metric, such as money or risk. Unlike simple cur-
rencies, however, universal currencies capture all externalities, and 
convert them to the money or risk metric.119 This currency has the 
 
 110. Id. at 11446. 
 111. Id. at 11446-48. 
 112. Id. at 11448-49. For a discussion of a proposed comprehensive currency in the habitat 
trading context see Jonathan R. Nash, supra note 34. 
 113. Id. at 11461-62. 
 114. Id. at 11446. 
 115. Id. at 11463. 
 116. William F. Pedersen, Jr., The Limits of Market-Based Approaches to Environmental 
Protection, 24 ELR 10173, 10175 (Apr. 1994). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11446 (discussing the inadequacy of the simple 
currency of tons which is used for the Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) trading market). 
 119. Id. at 11446-11447. 
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greatest potential because it allows the ease of using a simple cur-
rency, but captures all relevant attributes of a given trade, and in the-
ory, allows trades of “different, perhaps incommensurable, commodi-
ties.”120 Unfortunately, although a universal currency such as risk is 
possible in theory,121 our current ability to undertake risk analysis is 
not advanced enough to enable the use of risk (or money calculated 
as based on that risk) as a currency for markets trading in habitat 
conservation.122 
That leaves the use of a comprehensive currency. In theory, all 
externalities could be captured if the currency were designed to do 
so.123 For example, if the FWS thoroughly examined all aspects of the 
habitat being traded and all ways in which a species could be affected 
by a trade, and then ensured through this analysis that the trade pro-
posed was equitable, externalities would not be lost. The Conserva-
tion Banking Guidance suggests the use of such a comprehensive cur-
rency: 
Credit values are based on a number of biological criteria and may 
vary by habitat types or management activities. When determining 
credit values, some of the biological criteria that may be considered 
include habitat quality, habitat quantity, species covered, conserva-
tion benefits, including contribution to regional conservation ef-
forts, property location and configuration, and available or prospec-
tive resource values.124 
There is an extremely high information cost in designing such 
comprehensive currencies.125 Aside from the mere cost of gathering 
and analyzing all the data necessary to fully evaluate the quality of 
habitat for an endangered species, our understanding of natural sys-
tems is so limited that major uncertainty cannot be avoided.126 This 
uncertainty means that it is likely impossible, with current knowledge, 
to determine if a trade is equitable, even with unlimited resources. 
 
 120. Id. at 11447. 
 121. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WEINER, CONFRONTING RISK TRADE OFFS, 
RISK VS. RISK: TRADE OFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 30 (John D. 
Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, eds., 1995) (discussing how with improved methods of risk 
analysis understanding risk tradeoffs between seemingly dissimilar risks may become easier in 
the future). 
 122. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74 , at 11447-48 (describing reasons why risk cannot be 
used satisfactorily as a currency in many environmental trading markets). 
 123. Id. at 11446-47. 
 124. Hogan, supra note 3, at 9. 
 125. Tom Tietenberg, What Have We Learned?, 5 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 95 (1995). 
 126. Norm L. Christensen, et al., The Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 673 (1996). 
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Furthermore, increased information costs also raise transaction costs, 
which will reduce and potentially eliminate participation in any trad-
ing program.127 As Salzman and Ruhl state, “[t]he government has an 
incentive not to make the currency too expensive to mint, or no one 
will use it and the trading program will expire of its own accord.”128 
B. Market Structure 
If the ideal currency, one that captures all externalities and 
avoids nonfungibilities, cannot be found, the typical solution has been 
to structure the market to restrict trades to those that are equitable.129 
Nonfungibilities of space can be reduced by restricting the areas of 
exchange.130 Nonfungibilities of type can be reduced by restricting ex-
changes to precisely the same commodity.131 Nonfungibilities of time 
can be reduced by restricting trades to narrow time periods.132 For ex-
ample, the Department of the Interior’s Conservation Banking Guid-
ance deals with nonfungibilities of type by restricting conservation 
banking credit sales to particular service areas.133 Designing the struc-
ture of the market to artificially restrict transactions has undesirable 
consequences, however. First, restrictions may lead to undesired re-
sults when the artificially structured market interacts with outside 
markets.134 Most important, if the market is constructed to impose sig-
nificant restrictions, the market may become too thin to accommo-
date the trading volume and participants necessary to make the mar-
ket viable.135 The Guidance recognizes this, stating that “[t]he Service 
Area is an important component for the bank owner who will need to 
evaluate the marketability of their banks, that meaning the potential 
demand for their conservation credits.”136 Unfortunately, the Guid-
ance does not offer a solution. 
 
 127. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74 , at 11448. 
 128. Id. at 11461. 
 129. Id. at 11449. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 11451. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Hogan, supra note 3, at 8-9. Note that, despite making use of geographical boundaries, 
with endangered species there are no nonfungibilities of space, as discussed supra. Hence the 
geographical restrictions prevent nonfungibilities of this type. 
 134. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11451 (describing how the trading market may 
be structured to seek a particular conservation ratio between two types of habitat, but how real 
estate prices may dictate a different ratio, even under the rules imposed by the habitat trading 
market structure). 
 135. Id. at 11453. 
 136. Hogan, supra note 3, at 9. 
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This leads to a fundamental dilemma that must be overcome for 
all environmental trading markets to work, including those for habitat 
conservation banking. A robust market with a large trading volume 
would require little or no market restriction and a simple currency to 
allow for low transaction costs.137 Simple currencies coupled with little 
market restriction, however, fail to capture all externalities and fail to 
avoid nonfungibilities.138 
This dilemma, for the time being, seems insurmountable in the 
context of habitat conservation banks. Due to the myriad of variables 
playing roles in habitat function, many of which we barely under-
stand, the creation of an adequate currency has proved elusive. Fur-
ther constraint of the market will only make it thinner—and perhaps 
nonexistent.139 This potential for thinning of the market has serious 
consequences for endangered species conservation because once 
landowners stop participating, a net decrease in funds available for 
conservation will result and incentive will increase to employ the 
“shoot, shovel, and shut-up” method of avoiding liability.140 Although 
a simple currency such as acres can be used in habitat conservation 
banking,141 it may be at the expense of species recovery. The potential 
of conservation banking would therefore go unrealized. 
III.  IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION 
A. Why Habitat Conservation Banking? 
The astute reader may have at this point noticed something 
strange about the features of conservation banking in the context of 
endangered species protection. It appears that most conservation 
banks have been habitat conservation banks. Given that the ESA is 
primarily concerned with endangered species, and not habitat, this 
seems odd. Incidental Take Permits are not issued for destruction of 
species habitat, at least not directly.142 Rather, they allow an incidental 
take of members of an endangered species.143 If a landowner seeks to 
develop habitat that is suitable for the northern spotted owl, for ex-
ample, she may do so without obtaining an ITP if owls are not actu-
 
 137. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11453. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 11448. 
 140. Merrifield, supra note 75, at 217. 
 141. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11461. 
 142. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 143. Id. 
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ally residing on her property. It is only when a spotted owl is actually 
living on her property that an ITP is necessary to carry out develop-
ment that may result in an “incidental take.” 
This being the case, in a habitat conservation banking market 
sometimes individual members of an endangered species are traded 
for parcels of that species’ habitat. Since members of an endangered 
species and habitat suitable for that species are clearly not the same 
thing, and protection of one does not lead to the same level of recov-
ery for the species as protection of the other, trades between them 
will inevitably be inequitable. 
Why has habitat been used as a proxy for endangered species 
protection in the conservation banking market? The answer is proba-
bly because it can provide a very simple currency that allows the mar-
ket to function if, as has been the case, the simplified currency exists 
in units such as acres. Certainly, there are legitimate advantages to us-
ing a habitat-based approach, even from an endangered species pro-
tection perspective. Since habitat is not protected under the ESA if it 
is not occupied by an endangered species, habitat conservation banks 
preserve resources that would not otherwise be protected.144 This ad-
ditional habitat might allow an endangered species to extend its range 
and recover in the future.145 Furthermore, protection of animal habitat 
will also protect endangered plants that might share that habitat, 
which is advantageous since the ESA contains no prohibition on tak-
ing endangered plants.146 These speculative advantages, however, 
hardly make up for the actual unmitigated loss of members of an en-
dangered species. 
B. Finding a Currency that Serves as a Better Proxy for the Values 
Contained in the ESA 
Acreage proxies for the value of wetlands in wetland mitigation 
banks are inadequate because they fail to capture all of the ecosystem 
services that wetlands provide, particularly considering that these ser-
vices may differ among different wetlands with the same acreage. 
Likewise, an acreage proxy for conservation banking need not, and 
should not, be used. While an acreage proxy is cheap, quick, and easy, 
it is not an accurate proxy for the values contained in the ESA. In 
fact, focusing on habitat at all fails to capture the values contained in 
 
 144. Bean & Dwyer, supra note 61, at 10547. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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the ESA. Salzman and Ruhl state that “[i]f the currency does not ac-
curately capture the value sought to be measured, e.g., the habitat 
service, the flood control service, the water filtration service, we have 
less reason to be confident in the equivalency of trades.”147 The ESA, 
despite mention of ecosystem protection in its purpose, has not been 
interpreted to cover flood control or water filtration, except as they 
play an instrumental role in species survival. Rather, the ESA focuses 
solely on threatened and endangered species. As such, the only sig-
nificant value under the ESA is endangered species health.148 Unlike 
wetlands, which are valuable for many ecosystem functions that they 
provide, endangered species habitat is viewed under the ESA as valu-
able for one instrumental reason—to ensure the survival and recovery 
of threatened or endangered species. 
That being the case, whatever currency is chosen as a proxy 
measure of value for conservation banking under the ESA must accu-
rately represent the value of ensuring the survival and recovery of 
threatened or endangered species.149 Since the value of importance for 
the ESA is species health, the ideal currency for conservation banking 
would be a metric of species health or, more accurately, the survival 
probability of the species for some given period of time.150 If all the at-
tributes of the health of the population of endangered species could 
be captured in one metric, and then compared to the health of a 
population of that same endangered species in a conservation bank, 
and equated, the trades would be fungible. 
Unfortunately, using species survival probability is only possible 
in theory because “as a practical matter, our ability to quantify pre-
cisely current survival probabilities and the impacts of helpful or 
harmful actions is rudimentary to nonexistent.”151 The question then 
becomes whether another currency might be found that captures the 
value of the ESA in a workable, rather than theoretical, fashion. 
1. A Potential Viable Currency 
One unit of currency that might serve as an accurate proxy of the 
value of the ESA is actual members of a particular endangered spe-
 
 147. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11438. 
 148. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b) (2000). The ESA also values the ecosystems on which endan-
gered species depend, presumably instrumentally. 
 149. Bean & Dwyer, supra note 61, at 10540. As discussed supra, it is difficult to accurately 
pinpoint what social value the ESA provides, so we use endangered species survival and recov-
ery as a proxy. The currency chosen would therefore be a proxy of a proxy. 
 150. Id. at 10548. 
 151. Id. 
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cies. For example, if a development project were estimated to kill fif-
teen members of an endangered species, then an Incidental Take 
Permit could be issued to allow the incidental take of up to fifteen 
members of that species. In return, the land developer would be re-
quired to purchase credits in a conservation bank sufficient to con-
tractually obligate the conservation bank owner to protect the health 
of fifteen members of the same endangered species on conservation 
bank land.152 The DOI’s Conservation Banking Guidance hints at the 
possibility of using such a currency: 
In theory, population viability analyses could be used to quantify 
the degree of impact on survival prospects. In practice, however, 
the information needed for rigorous population viability analyses is 
often unavailable. As a result, the units of currency may take the 
form of surrogates for the extent of impact on population viability, 
such as occupied acres or nesting pairs beneficially or detrimentally 
affected.153 
This currency has several unique advantages. First, it is fungible 
across space, type, and time. As mentioned above, the value of en-
dangered species preservation does not depend on where that preser-
vation occurs, so there is fungibility of space. If the market is designed 
to allow trades involving only the same species, there will be fungibil-
ity of type—obviously all members of the same species are of the 
same type. Fungibilities of time also exist because members of the 
species will be preserved at the same time that other members of that 
species are incidentally taken. If there were any inequality of trade 
under this scheme, it would be biased in favor of species recovery, as 
conservation bank owners would be obligated to manage for species’ 
health while the developer would not.154 
Conservation bank owners would be obligated to manage for 
species health so that the permits they wished to sell would be recog-
nized by the supervisory agency, and would be further obligated as 
part of the contract associated with the sale of the permit. The con-
 
 152. In the alternative, the conservation bank owner would be responsible for increasing the 
size of the population of the endangered species living on his land by the amount that the popu-
lation at the development site is reduced. The reader may fear that using such a currency will 
reduce conservation banks to zoos that, perhaps using methods such as cloning in a laboratory, 
artificially increase the number of endangered species. The ESA already prevents this. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) establishes as a condition for a permit that “the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.” (emphasis added). 
 153. Hogan, supra note 3, at 10. 
 154. The developer would not manage for species recovery if she did no development. If the 
landowner engaged in on site mitigation, she might have to manage for species recovery, though 
she would not be held accountable for ensuring that species recovery occurs. 
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servation banking scheme could be constructed such that conserva-
tion bank owners would be required (1) to allow independent inspec-
tions of their land and management policies, and (2) to pay for any 
changes in management necessary to improve the health of the spe-
cies population residing within the conservation bank boundaries. 
Due to the uncertainty inherent in species management, conservation 
bank owners would naturally be apprehensive about being responsi-
ble for necessary changes, just as landowners were prior to the No 
Surprises Rule. A viable way to alleviate this fear, however, might be 
to spread the risk through an insurance program that would pay for 
any unforeseeable changes.155 Conservation bank owners could pay 
premiums to purchase such insurance, as in a more typical insurance 
plan, and the entire program could be subsidized in a manner similar 
to the federal crop insurance program. 
Furthermore, this currency is very easy to understand and use. 
The number of individuals in a species involves only one variable, and 
is easy to equate. It is a simple currency that ensures fungibility. Just 
as two tons of SO2 in one location can be traded for two tons of SO2 in 
another,156 the preservation of six members of a species in one loca-
tion can be traded for a take of six members in another. While the 
tasks of estimating the number of members of a species that will be 
incidentally taken in the course of a development project and count-
ing the number of a species present in a conservation bank is often 
not an easy process, it is one that now occurs in the HCP context.157 
Furthermore, it is far simpler than assessing all the factors necessary 
to create a comprehensive currency that would capture all external-
ities in a trade of habitat. The currency is so simple, in fact, that the 
government can simply “stand back and act as referee” and save the 
resource expenditure of taking a more hands-on approach.158 
Although taking fifteen members of a species at a development 
site in exchange for preserving the health of fifteen members of that 
same species in a conservation bank would lead initially to a net de-
crease in the number of that species (because the fifteen at the con-
 
 155. Such an insurance program has already been proposed to replace the No Surprises 
Rule. See, e.g., Meryl Eschen, A Market Based Alternative to Current Policy Under the Endan-
gered Species Act: A No Surprises Insurance Program (2004) (unpublished masters project on 
file with the author) (describing the basis for a No Surprises Insurance program). 
    156. Supposing that the trade will not create a spacial nonfungibility through the creation of 
hot spots. 
 157. USFWS & NMFS, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK, November 1996, 
p. 3-10, and 3-14 through 3-15. 
 158. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 74, at 11463. 
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servation bank would presumably be protected by the ESA anyway), 
species survivability would still increase because decreasing the num-
ber of individual animals will not necessarily decrease the chances of 
survival for the species as a whole.159 For example, “if none of the 
habitat of a declining species were initially under the sort of owner-
ship that ensured the active management needed to perpetuate it,” 
that species might die out, but it might have a better chance at recov-
ery if its population was actively managed by a conservation bank.160 
Seldom will the needs of a threatened or endangered species be 
met on a completely unmanaged piece of property. More com-
monly, an active management program—to control invasive exotic 
species, replicate natural disturbance regimes; prevent an area’s use 
by off-road vehicles, illegal garbage dumpers or others; and address 
myriad other threats—is essential to ensure that the potential con-
servation value of a particular property is realized and main-
tained.161 
Once the credits are purchased at the conservation bank, those 
members of the endangered species are guaranteed protection in a 
habitat that is actively managed for their health. 
Of course, if maintaining a “no net loss” of endangered species 
members is a concern, the currency can easily be altered to accom-
modate that principle. In this case, in exchange for an ITP allowing 
the incidental take of fifteen members of an endangered species, the 
developer would purchase credits sufficient to ensure the preserva-
tion of health of fifteen more members of that same species. 
a. This Currency Thins the Market 
Unfortunately, this type of currency is subject to significant mar-
ket constraints. To maintain equitability of transactions, trades must 
involve only members of the same species. If endangered species X 
and endangered species Y were traded, the currency would fail to 
capture all relevant externalities and fail to serve as an accurate proxy 
for the social value offered in the ESA. If this currency were used, an 
ITP could only be obtained to allow development in an area in which 
an endangered species resides if in exchange for the ITP the land-
owner preserves the health of the same number of members of that 
very same species in another location (such as in a conservation 
bank). If no other locations are known to support populations of the 
 
 159. Bean & Dwyer, supra note 61, at 10540. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Hogan, supra note 3, at 6. 
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endangered species for which the landowner wishes to get an ITP, 
then the landowner is simply out of luck and cannot develop.162 
One might suggest that although the landowner will not be able 
to develop, he will at least have a resource which he can turn into a 
valuable conservation bank. This outcome presumes that demand will 
exist for the credits the potential conservation bank would sell. It is 
possible that no other developers need ITPs for that same species, a 
scenario that would make the conservation bank worthless. In the 
face of such uncertainty, landowners are not likely to be assuaged by 
the possibility of using their land for a conservation bank if develop-
ment is prohibited. Because there is no certainty that sufficient de-
mand will exist, it is equally unlikely that a supply will develop. Con-
servation bank transactions will occur only when a developer needs to 
incidentally take members of a species that are coincidentally being 
preserved on a conservation bank with credits to sell. As a result 
there will be a very thin, if not non-existent, market. To work, a con-
servation bank trading scheme will require an increase in both supply 
and demand. 
b. Thickening the Market 
A solution exists for enlarging the conservation bank market, 
even if trades are allowed only between members of the same endan-
gered species affected: obtain information about the location and 
health of all threatened and endangered species before development 
begins, no matter the location. The ESA could be amended to include 
a provision whereby all landowners must obtain a federal develop-
ment permit in order to develop their land whether they expect the 
presence of a listed species or not. In order to get the federal devel-
opment permit, the landowner would be required to hire a certified 
environmental consulting firm163 to survey the land for threatened and 
endangered species. Because as much as 90 percent of all endangered 
 
 162. It would be possible for a landowner to establish habitat for an endangered species, 
transplant members of that species (which itself would require a permit from the FWS), and 
manage the habitat until the species population were viable on the land, and then sell conserva-
tion bank credits. The time and resource investment necessary before any return can be seen 
would likely prove prohibitive for many landowners, however. 
 163. The environmental consulting firms doing such surveys could be subject to a certifica-
tion and auditing program to help prevent the potential for corruption, which is high given that 
the landowners are paying for the survey, and would prefer that they survey report no listed 
species on their property. 
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species in this country are located on private land,164 surveying all land 
prior to development could lead to the discovery of many previously 
unknown populations of endangered species. 
When new populations of endangered species are found on pri-
vate land, both supply and demand for conservation bank credits will 
increase. As developers discover endangered species on their land 
and the federal government is informed of the discovery, the devel-
oper will have a choice: buy credits from a conservation bank in ex-
change for an ITP or use the land to create a conservation bank.165 If 
the developers choose to buy credits from a conservation bank, de-
mand for those credits increases. If the developers see that other de-
velopers are demanding credits, some will also elect to use their land 
as a conservation bank, leading to an increase in supply. The market 
is now thickened, and hopefully will be able to operate despite the 
market constraints imposed. 
This solution provides major additional advantages. First, requir-
ing that all landowners have their land surveyed before development 
would nearly eradicate the “shoot, shovel, and shut-up” practice. The 
required survey, undertaken by an independent, certified, environ-
mental consulting firm, would likely find evidence of such landowner 
tactics, after which landowners could be made to face civil or criminal 
sanctions. There is much less incentive to engage in such a practice 
when there is such a low likelihood of escaping the liability resulting 
from it. 
Second, and perhaps more important, surveys could be expanded 
in scope to include useful information about the land being surveyed 
beyond just the presence and number of endangered species. Perhaps 
the largest obstacle to protecting the biodiversity of species is lack of 
information about where they are, how their populations interact with 
each other, how their populations interact with the environment in 
which they live, and how humans impact their survival. In fact “. . . 
gaps in information threaten to overwhelm policies designed to ad-
dress ecological concerns and reduce the prospects for reconciling 
conservation needs with development pressures.”166 Hence the current 
 
 164. Gardner M. Brown Jr. & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species Act, 
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1998), available at links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-
3309%28199822%2912%3A3%3C3%3AEOTESA%E2.0.CO%3B2-Z. 
 165. Or, more likely, the landowner can sell the land, at a profit, to another organization 
who will manage the property as a conservation bank. It is also worth noting that the landowner 
has a third option, at least under the current ESA—create an on site HCP in exchange for the 
ITP. As discussed supra, due to the disadvantages of HCPs, this should be discouraged. 
 166. MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY 113 (1999). 
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policies, even if effective in theory, are unlikely to reach their full po-
tential due simply to lack of information. The first broad study of 
HCPs found that critical information about changes in populations 
and their habitats was lacking for most species.167 Mary Graham 
pointed out that “a National Research Council study in 1993 found 
that little biological information was used in government conservation 
decisions because the available information was not usually the sort 
that was helpful in decisions and because results were poorly commu-
nicated.”168 
If any future improvements to the ESA are to live up to poten-
tial, therefore, information about species and ecosystems is critical. 
The federal government lacks the resources to carry out such a com-
prehensive survey itself. Requiring landowners to have their own land 
surveyed as a condition of development would avoid this problem. 
Additional information about privately owned land in the United 
States would also be useful in designing a comprehensive currency for 
conservation banking that would allow some of the market con-
straints necessary for the implementation of the scheme to be lifted. 
Furthermore, the information need not be limited in scope to that 
which is relevant for endangered species protection. It may also in-
clude information about ecological services, for example. The survey 
could ascertain the qualities of the land with respect to watershed 
characteristics, flood control, and water filtration. When combined 
with information about surrounding parcels of land, this information 
would aid in creating a comprehensive currency to reduce the prob-
lems associated with wetlands mitigation banking. 
The information obtained from these surveys could be collected 
in a national information database.169 This database would provide 
critical information for land developers and governments trying to 
understand the environmental impacts of their projects. At the begin-
ning of the Clinton administration, there was an effort made to create 
such a database—the National Biological Service in the Department 
of the Interior. The intent of this service was to survey and build a da-
tabase to build national knowledge about plants and animals and the 
ecosystems on which they depend.170 Intense lobbying by property 
rights advocates resulted in the FWS losing most of its funding for the 
 
 167. Charles Mann and Mark Plummer, Qualified Thumbs Up for Habitat Plan Science: As-
sessment of Habitat Conservation Plans, SCIENCE, Dec. 19, 1997, at 2052. 
 168. MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY 114 (1999). 
 169. E.O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 312 (1992). 
 170. 58 Fed. Reg. 63,387 (1993). 
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project which was ultimately placed under the auspices of the U.S. 
Geological Survey, rendering it impotent.171 “As a result of such po-
litical decisions, the United States still had neither a national organ-
izational home for ecological research nor a framework for making 
important information widely available.”172 The information obtained 
through the surveys proposed could be used to resurrect the National 
Biological Service, and allow it to reach its full potential. 
2. Problems with this Solution 
Of course, this solution is not without problems. First, one may 
argue that the federal government lacks the authority to require all 
landowners to pay to have a survey of their land conducted before 
undertaking development. After all, the Supreme Court held that 
land use regulation is a “quintessential state activity.”173 
This is not the case when land-use regulations affect endangered 
species. The only two cases to deal directly with the ESA’s ability to 
withstand a Commerce Clause challenge have both held the ESA 
valid.174 The Court in Gibbs v. Babbitt said that “given the history of 
federal regulation over wildlife and related environmental concerns, 
it is hard to imagine how this anti-taking regulation trespasses 
impermissibly upon traditional state functions—either control over 
wildlife or local land use.”175 The case law, therefore, suggests that 
land use affecting endangered species is a federal, and not a state, ac-
tivity. This may be because such land use regulations “would call into 
question the historic power of the federal government to preserve 
scarce resources in one locality for the future benefit of all Ameri-
cans.”176 
Even if this solution for market thinning were to fall to a Com-
merce Clause challenge, it could be implemented through federal 
spending power pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitu-
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tion. The federal government could award planning grants to the 
states for implementing this proposal, and withhold other funds avail-
able for infrastructure improvements if the states did not. 
From 1970 to 1974, Senator Henry M. Jackson proposed a series 
of national land use bills, and in the same vein the Nixon Administra-
tion proposed the National Land Use Policy Act.177 This legislation 
was approved by a great majority in the Senate, but the House of 
Representatives did not approve it.178 One might think that because 
land use planning is a “quintessential state function” it seems clear 
that the national land-use legislation proposed by Senator Jackson 
would be doomed to fall to a Commerce Clause challenge. Instead, 
“[a]lthough recent United States Supreme Court decisions have 
chipped away at an automatic presumption of sweeping national au-
thority, it is unlikely that national land-use planning as such would fall 
on the unconstitutional side of the line.”179 The reason for this is that 
the national land-use legislation sought to require states to assume 
the responsibility for land use planning, particularly with regard to 
environmentally sensitive areas, but wanted the federal government 
to guide the structure of such programs.180 In order to get the states’ 
compliance “[t]he federal government would have awarded planning 
grants and, under some later versions, imposed stiff sanctions for non-
compliance, including cutoffs for federal highway and airport 
funds.”181 In the end, Congress rejected this legislation largely because 
it considered land-use planning to be a state and local rather than a 
national interest, “whether or not the contemplated federal role was 
constitutionally permissible.”182 Federal action of the sort proposed 
here may prove unpopular, but it is not unconstitutional. 
The damning problem facing this solution to market thinning is 
precisely its unpopularity. In the end, it would likely prove politically 
unworkable. “It is long known that endangered species . . . have long 
served as political lightning rods for property rights groups.”183 The 
National Biological Service required no action on the part of private 
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landowners, but it was controversial from the start.184 Congress voted 
to remove it from the auspices of the Department of Interior in 1996185 
after cutting its staff and budget the year before. 
The proposal outlined here, however, would require private 
landowners to pay to have their land surveyed, which not only would 
restrict their ability to develop if endangered species were found, but 
would involve surveyors looking for evidence that the landowner 
broke the law by engaging in “shoot, shovel, and shut-up” activities. 
Because the landowners would have to pay for these services, the cost 
of development would surely increase. Privacy questions also exist 
because this proposal requires that past actions by the landowners on 
their own land be examined before new development can begin. This 
would likely offend private property advocates even more than the 
National Biological Service. Considering that the Bush Administra-
tion is currently looking to change key provisions of the ESA,186 and 
that Congress may soon seek to dull the Act’s teeth through amend-
ments, the prospect of the proposal outlined here becoming a reality 
is virtually non-existent. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the amendments to the ESA contained in section 10 
were, with the addition of the No Surprises Rule, successful in en-
couraging landowner participation in endangered species conserva-
tion efforts, they may have done so at the expense of endangered spe-
cies health and recovery. This inadequacy, coupled with the fact that 
the status of the No Surprises Rule is in serious jeopardy, suggests 
that a new approach is needed to engage private landowners in con-
servation efforts. The use of conservation banks is such an approach. 
For conservation banking schemes to be successful, however, they 
must employ a currency that is easy to use and that serves as an accu-
rate proxy for the social value that the ESA seeks to capture. Conser-
vation banking must also operate within a structure that does not thin 
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the market. Although the Guidance issued by the Department of In-
terior offers some glimpses of hope, it does not adequately address 
these problems. Changing the units of currency from that of habitat 
acres to that of individual members of endangered species can pro-
vide a simple, workable currency, but it does so by imposing signifi-
cant market restrictions. Those restrictions can be overcome by in-
creasing both the demand for, and supply of, conservation bank 
credits. This can be done by requiring all landowners to survey their 
land for endangered species before undertaking any development ac-
tivity. Unfortunately, this requirement is politically impossible. Un-
less there is a significant shift in priorities such that the private prop-
erty rights lobby is greatly weakened, conservation banking will be 
unlikely to achieve its full potential for promoting endangered species 
health and recovery. It appears that we may have the way, but lack 
the will. 
 
